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Previous work stresses that actors use strategic technology framing—i.e. purposeful language and 
rhetoric—to shape technology expectations, persuade stakeholders, and influence the evolution of 
technologies along their life-cycle. Currently, however, the literature predominantly describes 
strategic technology framing as a sociopolitical process, and provides only limited insights into how 
the framing itself is shaped by the material characteristics of the technologies being framed. To 
address this shortcoming, we conducted a comparative, longitudinal case study of two leading 
research organizations in the United States and Germany pursuing competing solar photovoltaic (PV) 
technologies to examine how technology characteristics shape the strategic framing of technologies. 
We show that to frame PV technologies in their own favor, executives made use of four framing 
dimensions (potential, prospect, performance, and progress) and three framing tactics (conclusion, 
conditioning, and concession). Moreover, we show that which framing dimensions and tactics actors 
selected depended on the maturity and evolution of the technology they pursued, respectively. By 
highlighting how technology characteristics shape strategic technology framing, we contribute to the 
literatures on social movements, institutional entrepreneurship, and impression management. 
Additionally, by providing a coherent framework of strategic technology framing, our study 
complements existing findings in the literature on the sociology of expectations and contributes to a 
better understanding of how technology hypes emerge. 
 





Technological change is a process rife with uncertainty. Especially early in the technology life-cycle, 
many technological alternatives compete for attention, even though neither their performance nor the 
criteria to evaluate it are yet clear (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). This 
uncertainty allows actors to strategically influence others’ beliefs and expectations of technologies 
in their own interest. For example, existing studies show that actors working on novel technologies 
systematically try to influence the technology expectations of important stakeholders to generate 
legitimacy and mobilize resources for their own technology (Borup et al., 2006). Since stakeholders’ 
expectations and beliefs determine organizations’ access to financial, technological, and human 
resources, such efforts can significantly enhance organizational performance and prospects (Garud 
et al., 2002) and may also shape the evolution of technologies along the life-cycle (Kaplan and 
Tripsas, 2008). 
While actors have been shown to use various means to persuade stakeholders, such as 
technology demonstrations or pilot projects, studies highlight the important role of public framing 
through language (Cornelissen and Werner, 2014). The term “framing” has been used to describe 
both (a) cognitive processes of information filtering and interpretation that help individuals make 
sense of cues in complex environments, and (b) social processes where actors purposefully use 
language to influence others’ interpretation of objects and events, and ultimately change their 
behavior (Cornelissen and Werner, 2014). In this study, we draw on the latter definition, which 
conceives framing as an active, public act where individuals construct narratives in order to persuade 
stakeholders (Goffman, 1974). Indeed, scholars in the fields of organization theory, impression 
management, and persuasion studies stress that actors use framing in strategic—i.e., purposeful—
ways, and have studied the rhetoric and tactics that executives use to give meaning to events, improve 
corporate image, and mobilize support for change (Bolino et al., 2008; Kaplan, 2008).  
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Despite evidence that framing can decisively shape perceptions and expectations of 
technologies, however, we currently lack detailed insights into what framing strategies actors use, 
and how. Work drawing on institutional entrepreneurship and social movement theory has 
concentrated on sociopolitical variables when studying framing’s antecedents and nature. For 
example, it has been shown that framing is strongly driven by the actor’s own interests, and is most 
effective if it presents issues in a way that resonates with the audience (Garud and Rappa, 1994; 
Kaplan, 2008). However, these studies have not investigated in detail how strategic framing depends 
on the characteristics of the framed technology—i.e., its empirically observable, material properties 
and evolution over time.  
Studies in the field of the social construction of technology (Pinch and Bijker, 1984), 
technology-in-practice (Orlikowski, 2008), and sociomateriality (Orlikowski, 2007) stress that 
materiality matters, but without exploring how technology characteristics shape framing strategies 
aimed at influencing the expectations and beliefs of important stakeholders. One stream that more 
explicitly accounts for materiality when analyzing the narratives actors use to shape others’ 
perception of technologies is that on the sociology of expectations. This literature shows that to frame 
technology expectations credibly, actors tie together accounts of the past, present, and future (Brown 
and Michael, 2003); speak of the technology’s performance, historical progress, path forward, and 
end targets (Bakker et al., 2012); and combine positive statements with more modest or negative ones 
(Gardner et al., 2015). Despite these valuable insights, however, the literature on sociology of 
expectations focuses on how strategic technology framing shapes material factors, rather than vice 
versa and does not provide a coherent framework showing how specific technology characteristics 
affect actors’ framing strategies (Borup et al., 2006). 
A deeper understanding of how material factors influence strategic technology framing is 
essential, as it provides important insights into the agency actors have in framing technologies. 
5 
Moreover, studying strategic technology framing is important to understand the emergence of 
technology hypes as situations where actors’ claims (both technology developers’ and other 
stakeholders’) deviate from material developments, get picked up by others, and are translated into 
investments in potentially inferior technological options. For example, recent work on the sociology 
of expectations stresses that exaggerations by framing actors may spur future disappointments among 
important stakeholders (Borup et al., 2006; Garud et al., 2014). The fact that such disappointments 
may lead stakeholders to withdraw their support and damage the actor’s credibility raises the question 
of how technology characteristics shape the strategic framing of technologies. 
In this paper, we use a comparative, longitudinal case study to analyze the framing used by 
executives at the world’s two largest research institutes working on solar photovoltaic (PV) power: 
the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in Golden, USA and the Fraunhofer Institute 
for Solar Energy Systems (Fraunhofer ISE) in Freiburg, Germany. These organizations are well 
suited for our analysis since they focused on competing PV technologies that possessed different 
characteristics, while facing considerable uncertainty about which one would come out on top. 
Executives in the two organizations responded to this uncertainty by using framing that varied both 
across organizations and over time, allowing us to study in detail how technology characteristics, 
such as technology maturity and evolution, shape patterns of strategic technology framing. 
Our research makes several contributions. First, it advances the literature on social 
movements, institutional entrepreneurship, and impression management by highlighting the 
important role of materiality in strategic technology framing. Empirical studies in these fields portray 
strategic technology framing as primarily driven by sociopolitical factors (Cornelissen and Werner, 
2014). Our study indicates that material technology characteristics influence strategic framing in 
important ways, thereby complementing existing frameworks and answering recent calls to study the 
antecedents of framing (Borah, 2011; Cornelissen and Werner, 2014). 
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Second, our study builds on and extends the literature on the sociology of expectations. While 
this literature provides valuable insights into how individuals construct narratives to shape 
stakeholders’ expectations, it lacks coherent frameworks linking technology characteristics to actors’ 
strategic framing of technologies. We show that executives used four framing dimensions and three 
framing tactics, which they systematically tailored to the maturity and evolution of their own 
technologies. Reflecting these material factors in their framing allows actors to paint a more credible 
account of the strengths of their favored technology and reduces the risk of future disappointments.  
Third, our study also contributes to the literature on technology hypes by detailing the 
mechanisms through which strategic technology framing contributes to inflated expectations. We 
show how tailoring framing to particular technology characteristics allows actors to convey positive 
expectations about technologies, while distracting from material developments that favor 
alternatives. In this sense, our framework may help technology developers and other stakeholders 
identify exaggerated promises and technology hypes. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The role of expectations and beliefs in technology evolution and competition 
The dynamics of technology competition and their implications for organizations have long been of 
interest to scholars in the field of management and technological change (Dosi, 1982; Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986). Particularly at early stages of the technology life-cycle when new technologies 
emerge, organizations usually face considerable uncertainty (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). This is 
because new technologies often cannot be objectively assessed using well-established evaluation 
routines (Constant, 1980; Van den Belt and Rip, 1987). Moreover, actors need to assess technologies’ 
future, as well as present, performance. Such an assessment, however, is complicated by the fact that 
the most appropriate evaluation criteria, applications, and markets are rarely known in advance, and 
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also evolve over time (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Garud and Rappa, 1994; Santos and 
Eisenhardt, 2009). Therefore, the assessment of technologies depends heavily on expectations and 
beliefs (Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008), particularly at early stages of the 
technology life-cycle. 
The importance of expectations and beliefs in times of technological uncertainty creates both 
the possibility and an incentive for actors to engage in strategic behavior aimed at influencing the 
beliefs and expectations of others (Alkemade and Suurs, 2012; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). For 
example, by generating favorable beliefs and expectations, actors pursuing a specific technology can 
enhance its legitimacy among critical stakeholders, such as customers, investors, and employees 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Brown and Michael, 2003); ensure the supply of financial and human 
resources (Garud et al., 2002); and stimulate investments into complementary technological solutions 
(Konrad et al., 2012). Overall, by influencing expectations and beliefs, organizations can shape their 
institutional environment, chances of organizational survival, and the evolution of technologies 
(Garud et al., 2002; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). 
 
Strategic framing as a way to shape expectations and beliefs 
But how can actors influence others’ expectations and beliefs about technologies? Previous studies 
demonstrate that one crucial method is framing (Cornelissen and Werner, 2014). In the literature, the 
term “framing” has been used to describe both (a) cognitive processes of information filtering and 
interpretation that help individuals make sense of cues in complex environments, and (b) social 
processes where actors purposefully use language to influence others’ interpretation of objects and 
events and ultimately change their behavior (Cornelissen and Werner, 2014). In this study, we draw 
on the latter definition, which conceives framing as an active, public act in which individuals 
construct narratives in a purposeful attempt to persuade stakeholders (Goffman, 1974). Indeed, 
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studies in the field of organization theory, impression management, and persuasion studies 
demonstrate that actors, e.g., executives, use framing strategically to give meaning to organizational 
events, improve corporate image, and mobilize support for change (Bolino et al., 2008; Gioia and 
Chittipeddi, 1991; Kaplan, 2008; Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007). For example, studies in the fields of 
organization theory and persuasion studies show that strategic framing involves the use of analogies, 
metaphors, narratives, and the portrayal of events as opportunities or threats (Cornelissen et al., 2011; 
Gilbert, 2006; Sonenshein, 2010) and that whether a message is persuasive depends on the delivery 
style, length, repetition, speed of speech, and vividness (Bator and Cialdini, 2000). 
More detailed insights into how individuals deploy and combine such rhetorical elements to 
achieve desired ends are contained in the literature on impression management, which describes how 
individuals and organizations purposefully use language to enhance their image, or to maintain or 
regain legitimacy after controversial events (Elsbach, 1994; Leary and Kowalski, 1990). Studies 
show that actors use a variety of tactics to achieve these aims, such as concealing negative events 
(Sutton and Callahan, 1987); redefining events by selectively highlighting certain properties 
(Elsbach, 1994); denying responsibility for negative events (Staw et al., 1983); or offering excuses, 
disclaimers, or justifications that seek to explain the framer’s own behavior and portray them in a 
positive light (Marcus and Goodman, 1991; Schlenker, 1980; Tilly, 2006). For example, studying 
verbal accounts used by spokespersons in the California cattle industry, Elsbach (1994) found that 
acknowledgement was more effective than denial when companies sought to restore organizational 
legitimacy in the face of controversial events. In a different study, Elsbach et al. (1998) showed how 
hospitals used anticipatory impression management tactics, such as excuses, justifications, and 
obfuscations, to reduce patient complaints during the introduction of controversial billing practices. 
 
Drivers and constraints of strategic framing efforts 
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Organizational scholars have also started to clarify the factors driving and constraining actors’ 
framing efforts. In this context, recent studies on strategic technology framing typically draw on 
frameworks and theories developed in the fields of institutional entrepreneurship (Garud et al., 2002; 
Kaplan and Murray, 2010; Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001) and social movements (Benford and Snow, 
2000; Snow et al., 1986), which have long been interested in how actors can use purposeful framing 
to change formal and informal institutions. Not surprisingly, framing in this literature has been 
portrayed as being strongly driven and shaped by sociopolitical variables, such as individual 
interests, discursive opportunities, the framing audience, as well as the framing channel. 
 First, scholars have pointed out that framing is strongly driven by individual interests (Kaplan 
and Tripsas, 2008). For example, building on social movement theory, Kaplan (2008) describes how 
actors in the communication technology industry used skillful framing to push other organizational 
members toward supporting their preferred choice of technology. Similarly, Garud and Rappa (1994) 
show how organizations working on cochlear implants made use of systematic framing to convince 
regulatory bodies of the superiority of their own technological choice. In both studies, framing is 
portrayed as mediating between actors’ political interest and others’ beliefs and expectations 
(Cornelissen and Werner, 2014). 
Second, studies show that framing is particularly effective if it exploits discursive 
opportunities (Martens et al., 2007; McCammon et al., 2007; Snow et al., 1986), i.e., “salient 
discourses that are alive and have momentum at a particular point in time” (Werner and Cornelissen, 
2014, p. 1461). Framing that is embedded in the right broader discourse may appear much more 
sensible, realistic, and legitimate (Fiss and Hirsch, 2005; Kellogg, 2011; Koopmans and Statham, 
1999; Martens et al., 2007). For example, Van Lente (2000) shows how producers of high-definition 
TV used framing linked to the broader notion of “technological progress” to create what he calls a 
“forceful future.” 
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Third, effective framing has been shown to use narratives that resonate with the target 
audience, i.e., that are “congruent with the audiences’ observations, experience, and cultural 
knowledge” (Benford, 1993, p. 699). Kaplan (2008), for example, demonstrates that in order to 
influence decisions about technology investments in their favor, actors used framing to make their 
frames resonate with other organizational members. Thus, even when trying to alter the rules of the 
game, skilled actors rely on legitimacy and make use of familiar language and cultural symbols 
(Creed et al., 2002; Gray et al., 2015; Green et al., 2009; Kennedy and Fiss, 2009; McInerney, 2008; 
Snow and Benford, 1988). In line with this, recent research demonstrates that actors’ framing closely 
follows the demands of the most important stakeholders (Fiss and Zajac, 2006; Giorgi and Weber, 
2015; Gurses and Ozcan, 2015) and that actors adjust their framing to the framing channel (Bator 
and Cialdini, 2000). Previous studies demonstrate that actors have engaged in technology framing 
through various channels, such as the media or conferences, that require different approaches (Kaplan 
and Tripsas, 2008; Lampel, 2001). For example, it has been found that scientists adjust their framing 
when communicating with political constituents within and outside of science in order to achieve a 
high degree of resonance and garner public support for their activities (Frickel and Gross, 2005; 
Jasanoff, 1987).  
 
The role of materiality in the strategic framing of technologies 
While we have mounting evidence on the sociopolitical factors that shape framing, we know much 
less about how strategic framing of technologies is influenced by characteristics of the technologies 
themselves—i.e., their observable, material properties and their evolution over time.1 The literature 
                                                                            
1 It should be noted that in the literature there are different definitions of materiality. While some authors use the term to indicate that something is 
“material,” i.e., has an important influence, we follow Leonardi (2012), who defined materiality as “[t]he arrangement of an artifact’s physical 
and/or digital materials into particular forms that endure across differences in place and time and are important to users.” In line with our study, 
this definition puts particular emphasis on the empirically observable physical matter and form of objects. Moreover, while Leonardi (2012) 
suggests that physical material, form, and function are stable in the short run (i.e., do not change from one moment to the other depending on fluid 
interpretations), they may well change over time as a result of technological change. 
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stresses that credible framing requires actors to combine social and material elements into a coherent 
whole (Polkinghorne, 1988). Still, given that most theories on strategic, public framing originate in 
institutional entrepreneurship, social movements, and impression management, it is not surprising 
that sociopolitical variables have taken center stage. Existing frameworks in the field of impression 
management primarily study how actors use language to enhance their own image or legitimacy, 
rather than looking at technology. Frameworks rooted in institutional entrepreneurship and social 
movements have investigated how actors strategically frame technologies. However, similar to 
studies on impression management, studies in these fields do not explicitly discuss how material 
factors shape actors’ framing strategies. As a result, even though Weick (1979) suggests that 
technologies reside in two intersecting arenas—the mental and the physical—in many studies 
framing appears to be largely decoupled from the physical world, becoming primarily a question of 
actors’ skill in constructing reality (Garud et al., 2002; Kaplan, 2008).  
Three literature streams that have explicitly considered the link between material and social 
variables are the literature on social construction of technology (Pinch and Bijker, 1984), technology-
in-practice (Orlikowski, 2008) and sociomateriality (Orlikowski, 2007). Studies in these fields have 
investigated how social practices are entangled and co-evolve with material technologies to study 
how the social context affects the interpretation of technologies and how technologies shape 
organizational routines (Orlikowski, 2007; Orlikowski and Scott, 2008). In this context, authors have 
also demonstrated that organizational members use framing to shape the meaning of technologies 
(Leonardi, 2012). Thus far, however, this literature does not provide a theoretical framework 
describing how technology characteristics shape the detailed framing actors use in this negotiation. 
In fact, although the literature on social construction of technology explicitly considers material 
artefacts, authors have criticized its strong focus on social variables (Leonardi and Barley, 2010). 
The literature on sociomateriality explicitly assigns equal weight to material and social aspects 
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(Orlikowski, 2007). Yet studies in this field mostly focus on collective sensemaking processes during 
technology implementation within organizations, thus providing limited insights into the role of 
framing and materiality in the context of technology competition and evolution (Leonardi, 2013; 
Orlikowski, 2007). 
An additional stream that provides more detailed insights into the role of technology 
characteristics for strategic technology framing is the literature on the sociology of expectations 
(Borup et al., 2006; Garud et al., 2014). Studies in this field investigate how expectations, considered 
as “real-time representations of future technological situations and capabilities” (Borup et al., 2006, 
p. 286), are constructed and evolve. Regarding materiality, this stream has mainly explored how the 
verbal construction of expectations affects material reality (through the so-called “performativity of 
expectations”), rather than the impact of the material world on the construction of verbal accounts. 
Correspondingly, early work in this field stresses that “[n]ovel technologies and fundamental changes 
in scientific principle do not substantively pre-exist themselves” (Borup et al., 2006, p.285). 
However, later studies acknowledge that, even though framed expectations may not be true or false 
per se, different accounts may be more or less meaningful to stakeholders depending on their 
connection with data and ongoing developments (Van Lente, 2012).  
In fact, authors in the field of sociology of expectations have highlighted that using framing 
to shape stakeholders’ expectations involves a dilemma (Garud et al., 2014). Actors need to present 
stakeholders with comprehensive and plausible futures to gain legitimacy and induce them to invest 
resources. In doing so, however, they make commitments that fuel future disappointments (Ruef and 
Markard, 2010; Van Lente and Bakker, 2010). If actors frame technologies in a way that sets high 
expectations among stakeholders, they run the risk that developments in the material sphere will not 
live up to stakeholders’ expectations. Particularly if material developments are easily observable, this 
may lead stakeholders to withdraw their support and can undermine the legitimacy, credibility, and 
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reputation of the framing actor (Borup et al., 2006; Garud et al., 2014; Konrad, 2006; Rhee and Fiss, 
2014). Vivid examples of how exaggerated expectations and resulting disappointments may 
significantly hurt actors can be found in the literature on technology hypes, which studies the drivers 
and dynamics of exaggerated claims around technologies (Brown, 2003; Ruef and Markard, 2010).  
The fact that disappointments can significantly hurt the legitimacy and credibility of framing 
actors, raises the question of how exactly actors can construct narratives that promote technologies 
while accounting for those technologies’ observable or potential future shortcomings. Studies in the 
field of the sociology of expectations suggest that actors weave together accounts of the past, present, 
and future to build credible expectations (Alkemade and Suurs, 2012; Brown and Michael, 2003); 
draw on metaphors and images (Nerlich and Halliday, 2007; Van Lente, 1993); include statements 
about the technology’s performance, historical progress, path forward, and end targets (Bakker et al., 
2012); and adjust their framing as changes in the material environment render previous claims non-
credible (Bakker and Budde, 2012; Brown and Michael, 2003). In addition, in line with the literature 
on impression management, the literature shows that actors use modest or even negative statements 
in combination with positive framing to forestall future disappointments (Bakker, 2010; Berkhout, 
2006; Moreira and Palladino, 2005; Tutton, 2011). For example, Gardner et al. (2015) describe how 
clinicians providing deep brain stimulation to children with movement disorders used a mix of 
optimistic and more ambivalent and modest visions of the future when communicating with patients, 
to avoid raising unrealistic expectations and hopes.  
Despite these valuable insights, however, it currently remains unclear how the use of specific 
framing elements and tactics is related to the characteristics of the technology being framed, such as 
its maturity or evolution. In other words, we lack a more generalizable, systematic framework 
showing how actors tie their strategic technology framing to material technology characteristics to 
offer credible verbal accounts and avoid potential disappointments. Such a framework would help us 
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understand the agency actors have in affecting others’ beliefs and expectations of technologies. For 
example, to which extent do observable differences in technology characteristics lead to differences 
in the means of framing actors use when trying to influence expectations in their favor? Moreover, 
deepening our knowledge of the link between strategic framing and technologies may provide novel 
insights into the antecedents of technology hypes. For example, how can actors preempt 
disappointments resulting from a mismatch between stakeholders’ expectations and material 
developments? And how do organizations create positive expectations and beliefs about technologies 
in the face of observable shortcomings? Understanding how framing patterns are linked to 
technological characteristics and evolution may provide first answers to these questions and help 
investors, consumers, and other observers spot exaggerated claims by firms developing novel 
technologies. 
METHOD 
Previous studies have not explicitly investigated how technology characteristics and evolution 
influence strategic technology framing. We therefore chose an inductive case-study methodology to 
explore the mechanisms in detail (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Weick, 2007). 




As is recommended for qualitative case studies, we followed the principle of theoretical sampling 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). Specifically, investigating how technology 
characteristics shape the strategic framing of technologies, required us to find a setting characterized 
by (a) technologies that differ in their characteristics, and (b) technological uncertainty that induces 
actors pursuing the technologies to engage in framing to shape the expectations and beliefs of other 
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stakeholders. Based on these criteria, we chose to investigate framing at the world’s two largest 
research institutes working on solar photovoltaic (“PV”) power: the National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (“NREL”) in Golden, USA, and the Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems 
(“Fraunhofer ISE”) in Freiburg, Germany. Research institutes are particularly well suited to studying 
the strategic framing of technologies, since their core mission is to develop technologies. We selected 
these two research institutes for PV technologies, since (a) throughout the history of PV there has 
been considerable uncertainty about which of several competing PV technologies (if any) will 
dominate the market in the longer run; (b) the two research institutions strategically focused on 
competing PV technologies that differed in their characteristics; and (c) in the face of the 
technological uncertainty, organizational members have made extensive use of public framing in 
relation to the different PV technologies to influence the expectations of important stakeholders, such 
as funders, politicians, employees, or the general public. 
Since the 1970s, several PV technologies, each with its own advantages and disadvantages, 
have vied for supremacy (Hoppmann et al., 2013). While the market has been dominated by wafer-
based crystalline silicon (“c-Si”) technologies, there are two others with the potential to usurp c-Si: 
thin-film and third-generation PV (Bagnall and Boreland, 2008). Although these technologies have 
historically been considered competitors, since they all allow electricity to be generated from solar 
irradiation, it is still unclear whether one will dominate the market long-term. In fact, given that 
different applications favor different technology characteristics, it seems possible that the 
technologies continue to exist along-side each other in different market segments. 
To produce PV modules from c-Si, silicon of high purity is drawn or cast into ingots, cut into 
wafers, processed into solar cells, and finally assembled into modules. In contrast, thin-film PV—
such as modules based on amorphous silicon (a-Si), copper indium gallium selenide (CIGS), and 
cadmium-telluride (CdTe)—and emerging PV—such as nano, organic, or dye-sensitized PV—are 
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produced using a highly automated process during which a very thin semiconductor layer is deposited 
on to a carrier such as glass. 
Although NREL and Fraunhofer ISE pursue a similar mission of promoting renewable energy 
and energy efficiency through applied and basic research, developing technologies, and transferring 
knowledge to industry, they strategically focused on different, competing PV technologies. While 
NREL has put a strong focus on thin-film PV, Fraunhofer ISE focuses on c-Si PV. These differences 
in focus, together with strong uncertainty about which technologies (if any) would prevail in the 
longer run induced members of the two institutes to engage in framing that supported their respective 
choice. In our study, we focus on how the executives of NREL and Fraunhofer ISE framed 
technologies, since previous research indicates that top-level managers play a particularly important 
role in framing.2  
As the temporal boundaries for our study, we chose the time from the organizations’ inception 
to the end of 2013. NREL was founded in 1977 as the Solar Energy Research Institute (SERI) and 
designated a US national laboratory in 1991. Fraunhofer ISE was established in 1981. The fact that 
the thin-film and c-Si PV differ with regard to important technology characteristics and have evolved 
over time makes our setting ideally suited to study how technology characteristics shape patterns of 
executives’ technology framing. 
 
Data collection 
We combined archival data from various sources with in-depth interview data. First, to understand 
the broader environment, technology characteristics, and the evolution of the institutes’ technological 
focus, we collected data on technology performance over time, the institutes’ scientific publications 
                                                                            
2 For our study, we defined executives broadly as all individuals holding a higher-level leadership position—comprising, for example, the institute 
directors and heads of department, as well as the leaders of special programs at NREL or Fraunhofer ISE. 
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and patents, as well as executives’ profiles. We obtained data on technology characteristics and 
evolution from the two industry magazines “Photon” and “PV News”. We drew on the ISI Web of 
Science to download 3,916 and 1,559 scientific publications on solar PV by NREL and Fraunhofer 
ISE respectively, covering the years from their respective foundations until the end of 2013.3 
Moreover, we used Derwent Innovation to collect 353 patents filed by the two institutes to gain 
insights into their technological focus. Data on executives’ background was collected from the 
institutes’ websites and press articles. 
Second, to measure framing, we collected archival documents containing direct statements 
by executives of both NREL and Fraunhofer ISE. For this purpose, we screened the 5,475 scientific 
articles published by both organizations, searched their annual reports, and used Factiva to collect 
322 press articles containing quotes from their executives.4 We chose to collect statements from 
scientific and media sources, since previous research indicates that framing may differ depending on 
the framing channel and audience. Since we were aware that there was (and is) considerable 
uncertainty about the advantages and disadvantages of different PV technologies, we expected 
executives to use framing to argue for or against different PV technologies. Therefore, from all 
sources, we extracted a total of 287 statements in which executives publicly described and assessed 
the alternative PV technologies. To account for the possibility that differences in the assessment of 
                                                                            
3 The ISI Web of Knowledge only covers a limited range of journals. However, given that the majority of journals in which the two organizations 
have published are contained in the database, it serves as a reliable source to compare the technological focus of the two organizations over time. 
To obtain scientific articles on solar PV by researchers at NREL, we searched for the topic “solar* OR photovoltaic*”, while simultaneously 
limiting the address to “Golden AND (Solar* or Nat*)”. Using these search terms ensured that we were able to find articles by NREL published 
under its former name “Solar Energy Research Institute” as well as different abbreviations used for its current name “National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory.” To obtain scientific articles on solar PV by researchers at Fraunhofer ISE, we altered the address to “Fraunhofer AND Solar* AND 
Freiburg”. This search string for Fraunhofer ISE excluded all publications made by Fraunhofer Institutes other than Fraunhofer ISE in Freiburg, 
Germany.  
4 To identify statements that indicated the organizational members’ stance toward different PV technologies, we used a search string consisting of 
the names of the executives (in different variations) in combination with the name of the research institute. NREL executives included in this 
search were Dan Arvizu, Howard Branz, Charley Gay, Denis Hayes, Harold Hubbard, Lawrence Kazmerski, Paul Rappaport, Ryne Raffaelle, 
Duane Sunderman, Richard Truly, Gregory Wilson, and Kenneth Zweibel. Executives from Fraunhofer ISE covered in the search were Andreas 
Bett, Stefan Glunz, Adolf Goetzberger, Joachim Luther, Roland Schindler, Gerhard Stryi-Hipp, Eicke Weber, Gerhard Willeke, and Volker 
Wittwer. 
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technologies resulted from differences in the assessment of the broader category of PV technology 
in general, we also included statements on PV overall in this step.  
Finally, we conducted interviews with 16 current and former executives of NREL and 
Fraunhofer ISE. Interviewees from Fraunhofer ISE included the director, the two former directors 
(including the founder), the heads of the research departments for solar cells and technologies and 
solar cell development and characterization, and the coordinator of PV research, as well as four 
directors of two subsidiaries: the Fraunhofer Center for Silicon Photovoltaics and the Fraunhofer 
Center for Sustainable Energy Systems in Cambridge, USA. At NREL, we interviewed the current 
director, the current and one former director of NREL’s National Center for Photovoltaic, the Deputy 
Lab Director of Strategic Programs and Partnerships, the Director of the Center for Chemical and 
Materials Science, and a Senior Analyst in the Strategic Energy Analysis Center. Interviews were 
semi-structured and typically lasted an hour. To enhance reliability, interviews were transcribed and 
saved in a central database (Gibbert et al., 2008; Yin, 2009). Table 1 summarizes our data sources. 
 
TABLE 1: Data sources  
Data source 
Number of sources 
NREL Fraunhofer ISE 
Budget reports of political sponsoring bodies 50 11 
Annual reports 24 33 
Press articles 418 241 
Scientific publications 3,916 1,559 




Our data analysis consisted of four phases. In the first phase, as part of our sample selection, we 
reviewed background information on NREL and Fraunhofer ISE as well as press articles that 
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included statements by their executives. An initial round of open coding revealed striking differences 
in the technological focus and assessment of PV technologies across the two organizations. 
Therefore, we conducted a first round of interviews with (former) executives to better understand the 
history of the research institutes, their technological choice, and their assessment of technologies. 
These interviews confirmed our initial observations. Based on our emerging understanding of core 
constructs, we collected detailed data on technology characteristics, framing, technological foci, and 
executives’ backgrounds (see previous section).  
In the second phase, we used another round of coding to generate detailed insights into 
executives’ technology framing, based on the 287 direct statements gathered. To this end, we listed 
all executive statements and in each case coded the technology executives referred to (c-Si, thin-film, 
or PV in general) and whether the assessment was positive or negative (Hallahan, 1999). To 
investigate how executives used framing, we first experimented with coding based on concepts from 
the literature, such as prognostic, diagnostic, and motivational framing (Benford, 1993; Kaplan, 
2008). However, no existing framework or taxonomy explicitly took account of material technology 
characteristics. To be able to fully capture material factors, we therefore turned to inductive coding 
to develop our own categories (Gioia et al., 2013; Langley and Abdallah, 2011).  
First-order coding revealed that technology performance in terms of cost, conversion 
efficiency, material use, knowledge, and market share was a key theme. However, executives differed 
in terms of whether they referred to performance in the indefinite future, definite future, present, or 
past tense. Based on these observations, in a highly iterative process and using axial coding across 
the statements, we developed four second-order categories—potential, prospect, performance, and 
progress—that we labeled framing dimensions. 
We also noticed differences in how executives used these dimensions. All statements 
contained at least one dimension, but while they were used singly in roughly half of cases, executives 
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often skillfully combined them. To shed more light on this, we investigated statements’ syntactic and 
semantic structure (Fillmore, 1976; Pan and Kosicki, 1993), which yielded three additional second-
order categories—conclusion, conditioning, and concession—that we group into the category of 
framing tactics. Drawing on the concepts of framing dimensions and framing tactics, all statements 
were then formally and independently coded by two researchers, one of whom had not been involved 
in the research project, to develop a summary of technology framing for both organizations.5  
In the third phase, we conducted a second round of interviews to uncover the antecedents of 
framing patterns (Borah, 2011). Presenting the results of our analysis to interviewees, we asked them 
to explain the differences in framing, both across the two organizations and over time. Questions 
probed differences in the use of framing dimensions and framing tactics. Moreover, we explicitly 
asked interviewees to reflect on how their framing was related to their organizations’ technological 
focus, technology characteristics and evolution, and stakeholders. The interviews were subsequently 
transcribed and coded to assign the antecedents to our previously established categories. To glean 
additional insights into the role that technology characteristics played for framing, we also developed 
detailed timelines of how the performance of alternative PV technologies in terms of cost, conversion 
efficiency, material use, knowledge, and market share had developed over time. 
In the fourth phase, which overlapped with phases two and three, we used pattern matching 
to build a parsimonious and robust framework detailing how technology characteristics affected 
executives’ framing of PV technologies (Yin, 2009). For this purpose, we used both cross-case and 
within-case comparisons to uncover relationships between our framing categories on one hand and 
the characteristics of the organizations, environment, technologies, and target audience on the other 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). To establish these links, we drew heavily on our 
                                                                            
5 The intercoder reliability (Cohen’s Kappa) was 78.2%, indicating excellent reliability (Fleiss et al., 2003). 
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analyses of the organizations’ technological focus and the drivers of framing identified in the 
interviews. As recommended by Gibbert et al. (2008), we moved iteratively back and forth between 
our data and the literature to enhance the internal validity of the framework. We triangulated between 
quantitative and qualitative data sources. Moreover, we constantly challenged the external validity 
of the framework by discussing its application to other empirical cases (Gibbert et al., 2008). The 
iterative process was concluded when we were confident that the framework accurately captured both 
the differences and dynamics in framing we observed (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
FINDINGS 
Below, we present our findings on how technology characteristics influenced the strategic framing 
of technologies by executives at NREL and Fraunhofer ISE. We first summarize the two 
organizations’ technological foci and uncertainty about the technological evolution in PV. 
Subsequently, we show how, faced with this uncertainty, executives engaged in strategic technology 
framing. We describe the four dimensions and three tactics of framing, and explain how differences 
in their use across organizations and time are driven by technology characteristics. Finally, we present 
our theoretical framework. We use the codes D1–D48 and I1–I16 to reference selected archival 
documents and our interviewees respectively (list of documents available on request). 
 
Technology focus and uncertainty of NREL and Fraunhofer ISE 
From their foundation, NREL and Fraunhofer ISE differed considerably with regard to the PV 
technologies they pursued. NREL maintained a strong focus on thin-film PV, while Fraunhofer ISE 
emphasized c-Si PV. We found that this divergence was largely due to differences in funding sources. 
Throughout its history, NREL has “almost exclusively been funded by the US Department of Energy 
(DOE)” (I11), which, in turn, is allocated an annual budget through the US Congress (D1–D10). 
Since the DOE put a strong emphasis on funding thin-film PV, NREL focused on this technology, 
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and built specific capabilities around it. In the words of an executive, “they [the DOE] have chosen 
[…] to put the money into thin-film. That’s why NREL did so much thin-film” (I11). Only in recent 
years did NREL also step up its work on c-Si PV (I6, I11).  
Fraunhofer ISE, on the other hand, “put a strong emphasis on crystalline silicon” (I10) 
because it is a subsidiary organization of the Fraunhofer Society. The Society’s central mission is to 
foster applied research of direct value to the private sector. Therefore, apart from modest base funding 
of around 10%, it requires its institutes to competitively acquire all funding from third parties, with 
at least 25% coming directly from industry. Fraunhofer ISE responded to this by strategically 
focusing on research in c-Si PV, “where there is a direct interest of the industry” (1I8).  
Although NREL and Fraunhofer ISE focused on specific PV technologies throughout the 
study period, there was considerable uncertainty in the industry about whether c-Si or thin-film would 
lead the market in the long run—an uncertainty that persists to this day. As an NREL executive 
stressed, the issue was hotly contested at the DOE: “There has been kind of a competition, maybe a 
little dilemma as to how much focus to put on [crystalline] silicon versus the other technologies” 
(I11, I16). Similar indications that neither c-Si nor thin-film PV was perceived as a safe bet came 
from key Fraunhofer ISE funders. For example, in its 2008 annual report, Q-Cells, which had funded 
collaborative research at Fraunhofer ISE on c-Si PV, stated that “thin-film modules are gaining 
ground rapidly,” inducing it to invest in various thin-film technologies (D12). In a similar vein, the 
German Ministry for the Environment stated in its 2005 annual report that it believed in a 
“renaissance” of thin-film, and that “experts see good chances for a breakthrough” (D11).  
This funder uncertainty was crucial for NREL and Fraunhofer ISE, since both depended 
heavily on research funding from established channels. Historically, high overheads prevented NREL 
from gaining significant funds directly from industry, leaving it heavily reliant on DOE funding. 
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Similarly, being part of the Fraunhofer Society required Fraunhofer ISE to acquire much of its 
funding from industry to retain its license to operate. 
 
Strategic technology framing 
How did the executives of NREL and Fraunhofer ISE react to this uncertainty over PV? Our findings 
suggest that, in line with expectations, they made systematic use of technology framing to paint a 
picture that favored their own organizations. On the one hand, this was important to attract new 
funders. For example, as one executive emphasized, promoting the organization’s own technology 
was “of course a strategic question. […] It is about what you are working on and what you get your 
funding for” (I9). On the other hand, it also reassured past funders that their money had been wisely 
invested, so they would fund additional projects. In the words of one executive:  
Well, you can’t get away from the fact that these institutes constantly have to fund-raise for 
their activities and they need to give their supporters […] the sense that they are investing in 
the right things. […] If you say, “Hey, yes, I’m taking your money to develop this 
technology,” but then you turn around and go to conferences and say, “This technology is 
no good, that other one is much better,” I think that is hard to do. (I3) 
Both NREL and Fraunhofer ISE therefore engaged in framing to reassure their funders and secure 
additional funding. Indeed, interviewees reported that their expertise helped both institutes to 
influence the discourse on PV. For example, although the DOE “wants NREL to compete alongside 
of all different universities and other national labs” (I4), it also “relies heavily on NREL to develop 
their energy agenda. They heavily rely on the experts to understand what the cost roadmaps are, what 
the prospects of a technology are” (I3). As a result, NREL served as “a strategic advisor to the DOE” 
(I11) and has “been able to advise [the DOE] how the funds are distributed among conversion 
technologies” (I13).  
Similarly, executives at Fraunhofer ISE reported that they “frequently participated” in expert 
solicitations (I12), were “active in various political advisory boards” and company advisory boards 
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(I12), and “talked to politicians about which PV technologies make most sense” (I10). Moreover, 
when the industry emerged in 1997, “Fraunhofer ISE intensified its activities in industry-oriented 
technology marketing” (D74) by implementing a support function for “public relations and 
marketing” (I1). All these activities allowed executives at both institutes to show their own 
technologies in the best light to secure and further grow funding in times of technological uncertainty. 
Framing dimensions 
But how did executives frame the different technologies? We find that to positively portray their own 
PV technology in times of uncertainty, executives referred to different points in time—namely, the 
indefinite future, definite future, present, or past. This suggested four dimensions of technology 
framing, i.e. core temporal elements that actors use to strategically frame beliefs and expectations 
about the technology: potential, prospect, performance, and progress. 
First, executives spoke about the indefinite future to highlight the potential of a technology, 
i.e. its hypothetical performance (e.g., in terms of cost, conversion efficiency, quality, material 
intensity, market share) at an undefined point in the future. For example, Kenneth Zweibel, manager 
of the polycrystalline thin-films program at NREL, opined in 1987 that “[t]hin films can absorb 
sunlight in a thickness that is 100 times smaller than previous technology. It’s potentially 100 times 
cheaper for materials and manufacturing costs” (D13). Second, executives drew on rhetorical devices 
to convey a particular impression of the performance of a technology at a specific point in the future. 
As an example of this prospect framing, Eicke Weber, director of Fraunhofer ISE, predicted in 2007 
that “the market share of crystalline silicon will be at 80% in 10 years” (D14). Third, executives also 
used language to underline the present performance of technologies. As an example of this, Kenneth 
Zweibel noted in 1992 that “the development of cadmium telluride (CdTe) [thin-film] photovoltaics 
has reached a stage where it can be considered a leading candidate for cost-competitive PV electricity 
generation” (D15). Finally, executives used rhetoric to draw attention to changes in performance 
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relative to some time in the past. As an example of such progress framing, Jack Stone, the director 
of NREL’s photovoltaic division, stated in 1984 that “the extraordinary progress in […] the 
amorphous silicon thin film technology is indeed a high technology Cinderella story” (D16).  
Figure 1 illustrates the different dimensions along which actors can shape expectations and 
beliefs about technologies, and how expectations can be framed by referring to different points in 
their life-cycles. Table 2 summarizes the definition of the framing dimension constructs and provides 
further examples. Table 3, finally, shows how far the two organizations drew on the dimensions when 
positively and negatively framing thin-film PV, c-Si PV, and PV in general. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Graphical illustration of dimensions that can be used to frame performance of technologies to 
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performance of a 
technology at an 
undefined point 
in the future 
“Thin films may have the greatest potential 
for achieving the major cost reductions 
needed to make photovoltaic electricity 
competitive in large-scale world markets.” 
(1995, D17) 
 
“Thin-film devices are the only viable 
alternative that has the potential to meet [the 
DOE’s] long-term cost goal.” (1996, D18) 
 
"We believe that some of these [thin-film] 
technologies, such as polycrystalline thin 
films, have the potential to reach this price 
[of 3.50 USD/W].” (1997, D47) 
“For the terrestrial use of solar cells, 
crystalline silicon is favored [since] resources 
are (almost) inexhaustible.” (1982, D20) 
 
“Other than with indium, there is no threat of 
resource scarcity—right after oxygen, silicon 
is the second-most abundant element on 
earth.” (2007, D14) 
 
“[M]ulticrystalline silicon […] technology has 
the potential to reach an [efficiency] grade of 




of a technology 
at a specific 
point in the 
future 
“By 2000 a-Si [thin film] will dominate the 
photovoltaic market.” (1984, D16) 
 
“Large-area thin-film photovoltaic cells with 
10% efficiency will produce a multibillion-
dollar market by the early 1990s.” (1987, 
D22) 
 
“[T]hin films may surpass crystalline silicon 
in the marketplace by about 2010 and begin 
to make serious inroads in electricity 
markets.” (1999, D23) 
“In 40 years, electricity from silicon solar cells 
will cost only about three cents per kilowatt 
hour instead of 30 cents now.” (2009, D25) 
 
“In my opinion, the silicon cell that is sawn 
from crystals is irreplaceable in the next 10 to 
15 years.” (2011, D26) 
 
“The [crystalline] silicon technology will 





performance of a 
technology 
“Not only has its efficiency reached the 10% 
range, but it is a veritable thin film device 
(total thickness 6–8 micrometer) with 
promising lifetime and reliability 
demonstrations.” (1982, D27) 
 
“Amorphous silicon [thin-film] has 
demonstrated the largest uniformity of any 
semiconductor technology.” (1984, D28) 
 
“[A]morphous silicon has established itself 
as a viable competitor for wafer-based 
crystalline silicon devices.” (1995, D29) 
“There is an extensive scientific and industrial 
knowledge pool and devices have long-term 
stability…” (1982, D20) 
 
“Silicon solar cells have reached very high 
efficiencies in the laboratory.” (1988, D30) 
 
“Today, in many countries with high solar 
irradiation, solar electricity costs between five 
and ten cents per kilowatt hour. It’s one of the 
cheapest methods to generate electricity 
there.” (2012, D48) 
Progress 
Statement about 
the change in 
performance of a 
technology 
relative to some 
time in the past 
“The technology has come very far within a 
very short time.” (1982, D32) 
 
“Progress in developing CIS, CdTe and Si-
films continues to be very strong.” (1991, 
D33) 
 
“Substantial technical progress has been 
made during the last 18 months in the 
research and development of polycrystalline 
thin film solar cells.” (1991, D33) 
“Average conversion efficiency has risen by 5 
percentage points to 15% in the past ten 
years.” (1992, D35) 
 
“Innovations are being developed more 
quickly in the field of multicrystalline silicon 
as compared with other solar technologies.” 
(2002, D34) 
 
“[C]rystalline silicon technology makes 
enormous advances, also with regard to 
price.” (2011, D26) 
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TABLE 3: Use of framing dimensions by NREL and Fraunhofer ISE with regard to thin-film PV,  
c-Si PV, and PV overall 
 
 
Figures indicate how many times a specific framing dimension is used in the 287 statements in which executives of NREL and 
Fraunhofer ISE publicly described and assessed the alternative PV technologies. Darker shading denotes higher figures. Net framing 
is calculated as the difference between positive and negative framing 
 
We found instances of the four dimensions of technology framing in all 287 statements we 
collected. Interestingly, however, the frequency with which a specific dimension was used differed 
markedly across the organizations. Table 3 shows that, as expected, executives of both organizations 
showed a strong tendency to favor their organization’s “own” technology over alternatives. Also, in 
line with the idea that c-Si PV was the dominant technology, Fraunhofer ISE did not just positively 
frame c-Si PV specifically, but also PV overall.  
Interestingly, however, when framing the PV technologies, executives at NREL focused on 
the dimension of potential, whereas Fraunhofer executives focused on performance (to frame c-Si 
PV) and prospect and progress (to frame PV overall). Throughout their history, executives at NREL 
stressed the major potential of thin-film for generating low-cost electricity, while putting less 
emphasis on its performance, progress, or prospects. For example, in 1999, when c-Si had dominated 
the market for several decades, an NREL executive still stated that “[t]here can be no doubt that 
ultimately thin-film technologies should offer the best cost/performance prospects” (1999, D19). 
Positive framing Negative framing Net framing
Thin-film C-Si PV overall Thin-film C-Si PV overall Thin-film C-Si PV overall
Potential 76 8 8 0 10 0 76 -2 8
Prospect 31 7 4 4 3 4 27 4 0
Performance 44 14 6 22 16 14 22 -2 -8
Progress 41 5 18 3 3 0 38 2 18
Sum 192 34 36 29 32 18 163 2 18
Potential 6 15 22 2 2 0 4 13 22
Prospect 5 16 53 4 0 1 1 16 52
Performance 4 22 22 5 5 9 -1 17 13
Progress 1 18 48 1 0 0 0 18 48
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Fraunhofer ISE, in contrast, relied much less on potential framing but placed a strong emphasis on 
present technology performance. For example, in 1995, founder Adolf Goetzberger expressed that 
“[u]p to today, no alternative to crystalline silicon […] has been found that has proven itself in praxis” 
(D31). Below, we provide evidence on the factors driving the choice of framing dimensions. We 
show that choices hinged on the demands of key stakeholders as a sociopolitical factor, but were also 
shaped by the maturity of the technology being framed as a technology characteristic. 
Demands of key stakeholders as a driver of framing dimensions 
NREL predominantly relied on potential framing of thin-film PV, while Fraunhofer ISE primarily 
framed c-Si PV in terms of performance. In line with the literature, this pattern can be partly explained 
by the organizations’ aim of making their frames resonate with primary stakeholders. NREL’s 
primary funder, the DOE, favors more radical research distant to the market, to avoid biasing market 
competition. As one executive stressed, this made a stronger emphasis on potential almost a 
requirement for NREL when it came to seeking funding:  
In the US landscape, if you write a proposal to a government institution, you have to make 
much bolder claims about the potential, than I believe you have to do in Germany. You also 
have to make bolder claims of what you will actually be achieving. It has to be very 
ambitious, has to have very high potential, and it is very hard to get any work that makes an 
incremental improvement funded in the US […]. [T]he funding agencies will say that if it’s 
an incremental improvement, then industry can do it itself. (I3) 
In contrast, Fraunhofer ISE acquired much of its funding from industrial partners such as 
producers of PV cells, modules, and manufacturing equipment. Industry, however, was less 
interested in the long-term potential of a technology than its short-term performance. According to 
an executive, Fraunhofer ISE therefore found it most effective to frame expectations accordingly: 
As a Fraunhofer institute, we need to conduct research close to the market. We want to do 
research close to the industry, together with the industry. This means that in terms of framing, 
what is of greatest interest to us is how to improve the current performance, the progress. 
That’s what we look at very closely. (I1) 
Technology maturity as a driver of framing dimensions 
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While the choice of framing dimensions was driven by the institutes’ audience, we find that this 
sociopolitical factor alone was insufficient to explain executives’ framing. Choosing framing 
dimensions that resonate with the audience is important to realize short-term benefit. Yet claims of 
“high performance” or “high potential” can quickly be perceived as non-credible if they do not reflect 
empirically observable characteristics. Indeed, although methods for evaluating PV technologies 
have been refined over time, two core evaluation criteria—conversion efficiency and cost of 
electricity—were clear and measurable from the outset. We therefore noted that the choice of framing 
dimensions by NREL and Fraunhofer ISE was driven not only by the need for resonance, but also by 
material technology characteristics. Specifically, we found that which dimension executives chose to 
frame their own technology depended heavily on its maturity. 
The fact that c-Si PV had been invented as far back as 1954 gave it a head start compared to 
thin-film, which only dated from the 1970s. By drawing on silicon as the main material, c-Si PV 
could build upon decade-long experience in semiconductors, implying that many of its material 
properties were well understood. Moreover, although silicon was not an optimal material when it 
came to light absorption, c-Si PV—due to its early inception—consistently offered higher electrical 
conversion efficiencies than thin-film PV (up to 20% for commercially available modules in 2013). 
Indeed, from day one, c-Si PV was used in commercial applications such as extra-terrestrial satellites, 
telecommunication towers, oil platforms, and larger-scale power applications. The commercial use 
of c-Si PV helped researchers and industry gather experience in the field, increase its performance, 
and reduce costs through mass manufacturing. A major drawback of c-Si PV, however, lay in its high 
material intensity, which primarily resulted from the fact that to manufacture c-Si PV modules, 
silicon ingots had to be cut into wafers, which wasted a great deal of material and also required a 
minimum wafer thickness to prevent breakages. Since the high material intensity was connected with 
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high material costs, for many years it was unclear whether c-Si PV had the physical potential to reach 
a cost level at which it could compete with conventional power technologies such as coal or nuclear.  
The high material intensity of c-Si PV and related material costs led to the development of 
thin-film PV as an alternative technology in the 1970s. To produce it, a thin layer of semiconductor 
material is deposited on to a substrate such as glass. Hence, thin-film requires much less 
semiconductor material, holding out the possibility of lower costs for electricity generation in the 
future. Although thin-film allows the use of more expensive semiconductor material with better 
physical absorption properties, producing thin-film modules at a size that could power homes for a 
long time proved difficult, such that thin-film modules remained unreliable and were used only in 
niche applications, such as calculators. Indeed, as Figure 2 shows, while for the same amount of 
deployment thin-film showed significantly lower costs in EUR/Watt peak than c-Si PV, it always 
lagged behind c-Si PV in terms of deployment, such that it could not reduce costs far enough to make 
up for its disadvantage in conversion efficiency and reliability. Table 4 shows that c-Si PV does 
indeed show a higher technological maturity than thin-film along different performance dimensions. 
 
















TABLE 4: Indicators showing differences in technological maturity of c-Si PV and thin-film PV 
Category C-Si PV Thin-film PV 
Commercial conversion efficiencies (2013) 14–20% 8–15% 
Cost per Watt peak (2013) 0.59 EUR/Wp 0.60 EUR/Wp 
Global market size (2013) 112 GW 13 GW 
Global market share (2013) 91% 9% 
 
These differences in technology maturity help explain the differences in framing patterns 
across NREL and Fraunhofer ISE. By focusing on thin-film PV, NREL was pursuing an immature 
technology with uncertain performance characteristics that required continuous major investment to 
advance to a stage where it could compete with the dominant c-Si PV. As an executive noted, thin-
film had “disadvantages, for example with regard to reliability, and that we cannot control the 
processes very well” (I12). As a result, even if key stakeholders had required NREL to stress 
performance, the observable properties of thin-film PV would not have allowed executives to frame 
the technology this way. Instead, in line with the idea that thin-film offered potentially lower costs in 
the future, executives shifted their framing toward potential: 
Thin-film is disruptive, novel, and therefore you also have more potential. […] 
Therefore, you have to shift [your framing] to the future, to the potential. (I1) 
In comparison, the performance characteristics for c-Si PV were much more certain, such that the 
technology evolved along a more incremental path that allowed executives to be more confident in 
forecasting developments (e.g., using learning curves). Consequently, the higher maturity of c-Si 
allowed executives at Fraunhofer ISE to draw more heavily on performance framing to argue that 
potential thin-film breakthroughs were both unnecessary and unlikely in any case: 
C-Si technology simply has a certain stability, since it is the technology with the largest 
market share. I believe that therefore you put more emphasis on performance. Potential has 
always been the strength of thin-film. (I15) 
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In sum, reflecting the differences in technological maturity and hence actual performance, 
executives in both organizations strongly focused on those framing dimensions that were most 
favorable for their own technology. Doing so allowed them to credibly display their own technology 
in a favorable way—even though the technology suffered from significant shortcomings in other 
dimensions. As an executive we interviewed stressed, this framing, in turn, enhanced the possibility 
of acquiring funds from external stakeholders: 
So it is very obvious that this has to do with the framing, with the relative importance people 
assign to potential versus actual performance. […] You know, all these institutes, they are 
permanently in a state of rallying support for their activities. So obviously, there may be very 
conscious, let’s say, “positioning thoughts” behind that. (I3) 
Table A1 in Appendix A provides additional evidence for the influence of stakeholder demand and 
technology maturity on the use of framing dimensions. 
Framing tactics 
As well as using framing dimensions individually, in about half of the statements executives 
combined the different dimensions. We identified three patterns of logical combinations, which we 
label framing tactics. First, executives used what we label conclusion, i.e. logically linking 
dimensions by making claims about cause and effect. For example, Tom Surek, manager of NREL’s 
PV Program, expressed in 2005 that “[t]hin-film technologies have the potential for substantial cost 
advantage versus wafer-based c-Si because of factors such as lower material use (due to direct 
bandgaps), fewer processing steps, and simpler manufacturing technology for large-area modules” 
(D36). Here, performance framing is used to derive conclusions about the potential of thin-film PV.  
The second tactic was to position one dimension as the condition for another, a tactic we label 
conditioning. As an example of this tactic, Eicke Weber, director of Fraunhofer ISE, suggested in 
2012 that “if prices continue to fall, self-produced solar electricity from people’s own rooftops will 
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soon be cheaper than the 26 cents per kilowatt hour from the electric utility” (D37). In this statement, 
he describes the prospect of solar electricity as being conditional on continued progress. 
Finally, executives combined different framing dimensions such that a technology’s 
shortcomings in one dimension were offset by its strengths in another, a tactic we term concession. 
For example, Adolf Goetzberger, a director of Fraunhofer ISE, noted in 2000 that “in spite of its 
complicated manufacture and the high cost, crystalline silicon still dominates the market today and 
probably will continue to do so in the immediate future” (D38). In this statement, he conceded c-Si 
PV’s shortcomings in performance while still insisting on its positive prospects.  
Table 5 summarizes the definitions of framing tactics we observed and provides additional 
exemplary statements. Similar to the use of framing dimensions, we find that executives 
systematically used the different tactics to positively influence stakeholders’ expectations and beliefs 
about technologies. In the following, we first show that, in line with the literature, the use of framing 
tactics was driven by the framing channel as a sociopolitical factor. Subsequently, we show that, in 
addition, the choice of framing tactics was shaped by the material evolution of the technology. 
Framing channel as a driver of framing tactics 
Using conclusion, conditioning, and concession allows the four framing dimensions to be combined 
in ways that can lead to very different messages. In line with the literature, executives therefore 
reported that they systematically adjusted tactics according to the framing channel, i.e., the medium 
through which they communicated with stakeholders. For example, our interviewees explained that 
their choice of conclusion, conditioning, or concession was contingent on whether they had to frame 
technologies at conferences and in scientific papers, or in press interviews. As one executive reported, 
conferences required a stronger use of conditioning and concessions: 
When I gave presentations, I always had pros and cons [concession] on my slides. For 
example, silicon has the disadvantage of being an indirect semiconductor, which means you 
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and effect  
Progress leads to Prospect: 
“Improvements in materials, processing, and 
cell fabrication for a new generation of 
photovoltaic [thin-film] technologies continue 
to result in efficiency gains. Steady and 
dramatic advances are expected to continue 
during this decade.” (1989, D40) 
 
Performance leads to Potential: 
“Thin films are about 30 times thinner than 
photovoltaics produced using conventional 
wafer silicon technology and are also easier to 
manufacture. These advantages could make 
thin film photovoltaics much less expensive, 
opening huge global markets.” (1995, D39) 
Progress leads to Prospect: 
“The vision is that even in the year 2010 and 
beyond the main workhorse for PV power 
generation will still be the crystalline silicon 
wafer solar cell […]. This vision is supported 
by the fact that in the last 15 years the global 
market share of crystalline silicon has steadily 
increased at the expense of the a-Si thin film 
technology.” (2002, D34) 
 
Potential leads to Prospect: 
“The market share of crystalline silicon will 
still be at 80% in 10 years. This is because, 
other than with indium, there is no threat of 
resource scarcity—right after oxygen, silicon is 









Performance as condition for Potential: 
“If researchers can overcome nagging 
manufacturing and marketing problems, new 
devices could produce power for less than 
$0.50 per watt, low enough to make the cost of 
PV-generated electricity competitive with gas 
generators.” (1996, D41) 
 
Progress as condition for Prospect: 
“With continued success, thin films may 
surpass crystalline silicon in the marketplace by 
about 2010 and begin to make serious inroads 
in electricity markets.” (1999, D23) 
Prospect as condition for Potential: 
“It will take at least five years until one of the 
new [thin-film] technologies will have a 
significant market share. If it takes more than 
10 years, it will be impossible to catch up to the 
progressing silicon technology.” (1995, D42) 
 
Performance as condition for Prospect: 
“Should—a second scenario—one of the new 
technologies be successful, a market growth 










Performance despite Performance of alternative 
technology: 
“The solar cells highest in efficiency are made 
of single crystal silicon, but thin film devices 
use a lot less material and cost about a fifth or a 
tenth as much to make.” (1995, D43) 
 
Potential despite Progress in alternative 
technology: 
“Although crystalline Si PV manufacturing is 
still experiencing an exponential growth pattern 
in 1999, there can be no doubt that ultimately 
thin-film technologies should offer the best 
cost/performance prospects.” (1999, D19) 
Performance and Prospect despite lack of 
Potential: 
“Although crystalline silicon is not the optimal 
material from a solid-state physics point of 
view, it dominates the market and will continue 
to do so for the next 5–10 years.” (1995, D42) 
 
Performance despite Progress in alternative 
technology: 
“Despite the development potential of thin-film, 
wafer-based silicon solar cells have a future, 
since their long-term stability is beyond 
question and their efficiency can be improved 




Conversely, talking to the press, according to our interviewees, required messages to be conveyed in 
simpler terms, using less conditioning and more conclusions. As one Fraunhofer executive put it, 
framing newsworthy messages “requires more simplification. You can call it marketing, but it needs 
to be simplified. And you need to leave the if-then statements out” (I1).  
Technology evolution as a driver of framing tactics 
While our interviewees stressed the importance of politically adjusting framing tactics in line with 
the channel, shoehorning tactics into framing channels runs the risk of content diverging from 
material observations, which may undermine the framing actor’s legitimacy. For example, as one 
executive observed, using less conditioning in the press “raises the risk that part of the sentence is 
interpreted negatively, even though it wasn’t meant that way” (I1). Therefore, we find that framing 
tactics are also driven by observable material developments. In particular, framing tactics followed 
the technological evolution, i.e. actual progress in developing the organization’s technology.  
While throughout the period of investigation, c-Si PV outperformed thin-film with regard to 
conversion efficiencies, reliability, and market share, neither technology developed in a linear way. 
Instead, at several points, both technologies met bottlenecks and setbacks that seemed to favor their 
rival. For example, Figure 3 shows the development of record conversion efficiencies of c-Si PV and 
thin-film PV, as well as the market share of thin-film PV. It shows that the conversion efficiencies of 
neither technology rose uniformly; instead, they experienced periods of strong growth and stagnation. 
Similarly, the market share of thin-film fluctuated over time. In the 1980s, thin-film PV began to be 
used in portable electronics such as calculators, rapidly rising to a market share of 32% by 1988. In 
the 1990s, however, c-Si regained market share, to the extent that by 2004 thin-film only made up 
around 4% of the market. Then, a bottleneck in the supply of industrial-grade silicon in c-Si PV 





FIGURE 3: Development of conversion efficiencies and market share of c-Si PV and  
thin-film PV (Fraunhofer ISE, 2017; NREL, 2017) 
 
We observe that executives at both NREL and Fraunhofer ISE systematically adjusted their 
framing tactics to the evolution of the technologies. While one might assume that changes in the 
evolution of the technology may lead to changes in framing dimensions (e.g., the extent to which 
actors focus on “progress” or “performance”), interestingly the use of individual dimensions in our 
case remained relatively stable over time. Instead of switching framing dimensions, executives 
adjusted to technology evolution by varying framing tactics—i.e. combining the framing dimensions 
differently through conclusion, conditioning, and concession. 
Executives used conclusion when a technology’s development was going well, since it 
allowed them to signal to resource providers that a current development would continue in the future. 
For example, NREL executives used conclusion to point to positive trends in conversion efficiencies 
during the 1980s, while Fraunhofer ISE employed this framing tactic in the face of c-Si’s rising 
market share in the 1990s. In such contexts, conclusion provides a powerful tool to enhance the 
positive image of a technology among stakeholders, since a positive observation on one dimension 
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is used to enhance expectations in another. For example, in 2002, a Fraunhofer manager stated that 
“The vision is that even in the year 2010 and beyond the main workhorse for PV power generation 
will still be the crystalline silicon wafer solar cell […]. This vision is supported by the fact that in the 
last 15 years the global market share of crystalline silicon has steadily increased at the expense of the 
a-Si thin film technology” (D34). In this statement, the positive progress of c-Si PV is used to draw 
a conclusion about its prospects—a tactic that only works because c-Si PV has actually developed in 
a positive way. 
Conditioning was used in times of particularly great uncertainty. For example, executives at 
both NREL and Fraunhofer ISE relied on it heavily during the 1980s and 1990s, when thin-film 
emerged as a new technology but both its performance and market outlook were very uncertain. As 
one executive noted, during this period “the entire field of photovoltaics was still far from being 
economic, and extrapolating into the future was difficult” (I15). Another executive confirmed that, 
particularly at this early stage, executives had to rely heavily on conditioning, since “the further you 
look into the future, the more uncertain everything becomes and the more scientific work is needed 
and done, which means that you can only make very tentative predictions” (I12). 
Finally, concession was used when technology or market developments for the organizations’ 
favored technologies were not going to plan, since it served to justify resource providers’ continued 
investment despite such issues. We found that executives used concession to highlight both the merits 
of their own technology (despite its shortcomings) and the shortcomings of others’ (despite their 
merits). For example, endorsing NREL’s focus on thin-film in 1993, when its market share was 
plummeting and conversion efficiencies continued to lag behind, Jack Stone, the director of NREL’s 
photovoltaic division, stated, “Thin films […] typically have lower efficiencies. Ultimately, however, 
thin films will be necessary for producing low-cost electricity, because the bottom line—the cost per 
watt—is more important than the efficiency” (D45). Just four years later, Satyen K. Deb, the director 
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of NREL’s Center for Basic Sciences, used concession to undermine the viability of c-Si PV: 
“Although enormous progress has been made in reducing the cost of silicon-based technology, it is 
not certain whether it can meet our ultimate cost goals” (D46). In both statements, NREL executives 
sought to justify why, even though the performance and progress of thin-film was lagging behind c-
Si, NREL continued to explore thin-film technologies. In this sense, the tactic of concession helped 
NREL secure important resources from stakeholders in times of negative technology evolution 
without risking its own credibility. Table A2 in Appendix A provides additional evidence for the 
influence of framing channels and technology evolution on the use of framing tactics. 
 
Emerging theoretical framework 
Figure 4 shows the theoretical framework we developed that illustrates how technology 
characteristics shape the strategic framing of technologies. We find that executives systematically 
draw on four dimensions (1)—potential, prospect, performance, and progress—and three tactics 
(2)—conclusion, conditioning, and concession—to frame technology expectations and beliefs. The 
framing dimensions describe whether, when framing a technology, executives stress the hypothetical 
performance of a technology at an undefined point in the future (potential), its predicted performance 
at a specific point in the future (prospect), its present performance (performance), or the change in 
its performance relative to some time in the past (progress). Framing tactics, in turn, describe how an 
actor combines the different dimensions when strategically framing a technology. Specifically, we 
observe that executives link the different dimensions by making claims about cause and effect 
(conclusion), positioning one dimension as the condition for another (conditioning), and offsetting 
shortcomings in one dimension with strengths in another (concession). 
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FIGURE 4: Theoretical model showing how technology characteristics influence  
the strategic framing of technologies 
 
Our findings suggest that, in line with the literature, the use of framing dimensions and tactics 
is influenced by sociopolitical factors, such as the degree to which the framing resonates with the 
demands of key stakeholders and the framing channel. However, the framing dimensions and tactics 
are also directly shaped by material technology characteristics. Specifically, we show that 
technological maturity (3) shapes the use of framing dimensions. Even though in theory actors can 
freely choose among the different framing dimensions to shape expectations and beliefs regarding a 
specific technology, we find that actors whose firms pursue a more mature technology (3a) focus on 
framing the merits of their technology along the dimensions of performance (1a), whereas those 
whose firms pursue a less mature technology (3b) focus on the framing dimensions of potential (1b). 
Similarly, our findings indicate that the use of framing tactics (2) is strongly driven by technology 
evolution (4). Specifically, our findings indicate that when the technology of an organization evolves 
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positively (4a), actors draw heavily on the framing tactic of conclusion (2a) to signal that the positive 
development in a specific dimension is likely to have a positive effect on other dimensions. When 
the evolution of technologies is uncertain (4b), actors draw more heavily on the tactic of conditioning 
(2b) to signal positive expectations while forestalling a loss of credibility if a forecast development 
does not materialize. Finally, when the evolution of the technology is negative (4c), actors fall back 
on the tactic of concession (2c) to emphasize that despite some shortcomings in a specific dimension 
(e.g., current performance or progress), the technology offers advantages in another (e.g., potential). 
Our framework can be used to derive propositions about the impact of material technology 
characteristics on framing in other contexts. For example, we would generally expect new entrants 
working on novel technologies to make more use of potential and progress framing than incumbent 
firms that focus on more established technological solutions. Moreover, we would expect that 
organizations in industries characterized by a lower technological uncertainty than PV rely less on 
conditioning than the executives of the firms in our sample. 
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Implications for the literature 
Social movements, institutional entrepreneurship, and impression management 
First, by developing a framework that highlights the role of materiality in strategic technology 
framing, our study contributes to the literature on social movements, institutional entrepreneurship, 
and impression management. This literature stresses that shaping others’ beliefs and expectations 
involves developing narratives that weave social and material elements into coherent plots (Garud et 
al., 2014; Polkinghorne, 1988). Yet, extant empirical studies of strategic technology framing in this 
field have strongly focused on sociopolitical factors. This is not surprising, given that studies usually 
draw on frameworks rooted in institutional theory. At the same time, however, our study suggests 
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that relying on this theoretical angle may have led to accounts of framing that underestimate (or at 
least insufficiently discuss) the role of material factors.  
We show that material factors shape and constrain framing in important ways, suggesting that 
actors may have less agency than is currently assumed in many accounts of strategic technology 
framing. In this sense, this study complements existing frameworks building on institutional 
entrepreneurship and social movement theory by painting a more comprehensive picture of how 
material and sociopolitical factors jointly shape the strategic framing of technologies. This represents 
a first step toward a better understanding of what the social-movements literature calls “frame 
articulation,” i.e. “the connection and alignment of events and experiences so that they hang together 
in a relatively unified and compelling fashion” (Benford and Snow, 2000: 623).  
The literature on impression management has long dealt with the question of how individuals 
and organizations use language to portray events in a favorable light. In this context, scholars suggest 
that spokespersons use a number of tactics, such as justifications, denials, and references to 
organizational characteristics. In line with these findings, we show that representatives of NREL and 
Fraunhofer ISE used different tactics (conclusion, conditioning, and concession) when strategically 
framing technologies. However, in contrast to the literature on impression management, which 
focuses on how actors use framing to enhance their own legitimacy or image (Bolino et al., 2008), 
our study explains how actors are able to shape others’ beliefs and expectations about technologies. 
Our framework thus provides a taxonomy for analyzing strategic framing in dimensions that are not 
covered by existing frameworks in the field of impression management. In this sense, we also answer 
recent calls for a closer investigation of how frames are constructed and evolve (Borah, 2011; 
Cornelissen and Werner, 2014; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). Moreover, our study demonstrates the 
merits of applying detailed syntactic and semantic analyses to the study of framing (Fillmore, 1976; 
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Pan and Kosicki, 1993). As Cornelissen and Werner (2014) note, despite the importance of language 
structure for framing, such analyses have been largely absent from organizational research. 
Sociology of expectations 
Second, our study contributes to the literature on the sociology of expectations by providing insights 
into the detailed mechanisms through which technology characteristics shape actors’ strategic 
framing of technologies. Previous research in this field has investigated how actors use verbal 
accounts to construct and contribute to the realization of expectations. Studies have started to 
investigate the role of materiality by showing that to build credible expectations, actors link the past, 
present, and future (Brown and Michael, 2003); describe the technology’s performance, historical 
progress, path forward, and end targets (Bakker et al., 2012); and combine positive with more modest 
or negative statements (Gardner et al., 2015). However, since the main focus is on understanding 
how expectations shape materiality (rather than vice versa), this literature does not provide a coherent 
framework showing how actors’ choice of framing elements depends on the specific characteristics 
of the framed technologies.  
Addressing this shortcoming, we provide a novel taxonomy of technology framing and a 
theoretical framework (see Figure 4). Our taxonomy describes technology framing as consisting of 
two main elements: dimensions and tactics. In contrast to existing framing concepts such as 
diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing (Benford and Snow, 2000), which explain how 
actors mobilize action around a specific issue, our taxonomy focuses on explaining how actors 
strategically frame beliefs and expectations of a developing material entity. 
The framework builds on and extends existing frameworks in the literature on sociology of 
expectations. For example, although our framing dimensions were inductively derived from the data, 
they show surprising similarities with Bakker et al.’s (2012) suggestion that “actors assess 
expectations as credible when they build on current performance and recent progress, the 
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identification and construction of a path forward and a target performance level that the technological 
option is supposedly able to meet.” Going beyond Bakker et al. (2012), however, we discuss how 
actors use framing tactics to link the different dimensions and provide detailed accounts of how the 
use of framing dimensions and tactics is linked to technology characteristics. Specifically, we show 
that framing dimensions are primarily driven by the maturity of the technology pursued by the actor 
and that the use of framing tactics strongly hinges on technology evolution. For example, even though 
in theory actors can freely choose among the different framing dimensions to shape the expectations 
and beliefs regarding a specific technology, executives at Fraunhofer ISE, which pursued a more 
mature and reliable PV technology, strongly focused on framing PV technology on the dimension of 
performance. In contrast, executives at NREL, which pursued a less mature but potentially cheaper 
technology, strongly framed PV technologies on the dimension of potential. Moreover, executives in 
both organizations varied their framing tactics in line with technology evolution. For example, 
whenever their own technology was making good progress, executives reverted to the tactic of 
conclusion to signal that positive developments would continue in the future. Whenever progress was 
slow, executives made use of concession to convey that despite some shortcomings their technology 
offered considerable advantages. 
Borup et al. (2006, p. 287) suggest that “it has become increasingly important to develop a 
vocabulary and analytical perspectives with which to make sense of the promissory and future-
oriented properties of innovation networks, especially given the highly contested character of 
expectations and futures.” Similarly, Brown et al. (2003, p. 6) argue that “another foundational issue 
here is whether to see expectations as essentially rhetorical or material in character. [...] We have to 
further articulate the way in which these two phenomena relate to each other. That is, what are the 
routes of transmission between rhetoric and materiality?” By providing a coherent, integrative 
framework that describes how technology characteristics shape strategic technology framing, our 
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study heeds these calls and provides a better understanding of the relationship between expectations 
and the material world. 
Technology hypes 
Finally, our study helps explain the role of framing in technology hypes. The literature suggests that 
hypes result from so-called “expectation races,” where organizations create ever-higher expectations 
to secure resources from important stakeholders (Brown, 2003; Ruef and Markard, 2010). However, 
a puzzle is how organizations can generate narratives that are profoundly decoupled from material 
developments without losing credibility. We find intriguing indications that one answer might lie in 
actors closely tailoring framing to technology characteristics. One might assume that by including 
material factors in their framing, actors must reveal more about the actual merits and evolution of 
their technology. However, we show that by can generate accounts that, while true, serve to distract 
from unfavorable material developments. For example, by strategically selecting framing dimensions 
that highlight merits of the technology, and drawing on tactics that correspond with technology 
evolution, actors may be able to convey positive expectations about technologies despite observable 
shortcomings. 
By showing how actors portray technologies in a positive light, our results also have 
implications for practice, since they could help executives infer material developments from framing 
patterns, making it easier to identify exaggerated claims and hypes. If, for example, actors 
continuously stress the potential—rather than the performance—of their technology over a long 
period of time, this may indicate a continued lack of a technological maturity, which may be 
problematic if stakeholders are interested in commercial/workable technologies. Particularly if 
stakeholders lack the expertise or information to independently check claims by technology 
developers, our study may help them avoid mis-investments and associated social costs (Borup et al., 
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2006; Konrad et al., 2012). Overall, our framework therefore promises to improve the effectiveness 
of technology investments under uncertainty. 
 
Limitations and future research 
The limitations of our study suggest avenues for future research. First, our study is limited to the 
investigation of two research organizations. For-profit organizations (e.g., firms) differ from the 
organizations we investigated in terms of their primary purpose, their time horizons, and their sources 
of funding, which may influence framing patterns (Rip, 1994). Moreover, the impact of material 
technology characteristics on framing may differ depending on the accessibility of information by 
stakeholders. If actors’ claims about technologies cannot be easily evaluated by the framing 
audience—e.g., because the artifact is not accessible to the public, or assessing its performance 
requires specific expertise—this may give actors more leeway to deviate from material 
developments. In fact, knowledge claims by members of the two research institutes we study are 
difficult for outsiders to assess, since the knowledge is often proprietary and highly specific. This 
suggests that material factors may play an even more important role for framing in other settings. 
Future research should thus validate and refine our findings by investigating framing in contexts 
different from ours.  
Second, a challenge in our study was that the institutes we investigate differ not only in their 
technological choice but also in their funding sources (public vs. private) and home base (US vs. 
Germany), making it harder to link differences in framing to differences in technology characteristics. 
To distill the impact of technology characteristics, we drew on variation in funding sources over time, 
screened other research institutes in the respective countries, and used qualitative interviews. Based 
on these analyses, we find that the differences in funding sources and culture partly explain 
differences in framing tactics (see findings), but that technology characteristics provide an important, 
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complementary explanation. However, given that our research does not allow us to specify the 
relative size of effects precisely, we call for future studies that verify our findings in alternative 
settings. In this context, researchers should also go beyond studying how material entities shape 
framing to investigate how they may directly influence expectations and beliefs (e.g., as actors 
directly experience pilot projects or prototypes).  
Third, a limitation of our study lies in the fact that it takes the perspective of the framing 
organization rather than the audience. While this focus allows a more in-depth descriptions of 
framing techniques and antecedents, it provides limited insights into the effects of framing. Our data 
suggest that the framing used by the executives of NREL and Fraunhofer ISE was important for the 
organizations to continuously acquire resources in times of technological uncertainty. Amid 
considerable uncertainty over which technology would prevail, one would expect investors to be 
reluctant to fund organizations that have clearly committed to one technological option. Our findings 
suggest that framing technologies in a way that reflected both sociopolitical and material factors 
enabled the two organizations not only to survive, but to significantly increase their budgets over 
time. Since the effects of framing are beyond the scope of this paper, however, we call for future 
research that tests our propositions more formally and also investigates the effectiveness of 
alternative framing tactics. For example, future research could take the perspective of the audience 
in order to provide more details on the effectiveness of different methods of expectation framing 
under different conditions (Giorgi and Weber, 2015). One possible approach would be to 
systematically vary the use of framing dimensions and tactics in experiments and measure the effect 
on individuals’ decision-making. In this context, it would also be interesting to study how the 
effectiveness of specific types of framing varies by audience type—for example, the general public 




We develop a framework that describes how technology characteristics, such as the maturity and 
evolution of technologies, shape how actors publicly and purposefully frame technologies to 
influence important stakeholders. By highlighting the role of materiality, our study complements 
existing studies on strategic framing that draw on theories developed in the fields of social 
movements, institutional entrepreneurship, and impression management. By providing a coherent 
framework of how technology characteristics shape strategic technology framing, our work extends 
and integrates existing findings in the literature on the sociology of expectations. Moreover, by 
generating insights into how actors are able to frame technologies in a positive way despite 
observable shortcomings, our framework helps explain the emergence of technology hypes. In this 
sense, we believe that our framework of strategic technology framing holds much potential for future 
research that seeks to understand technology dynamics and the performance of organizations 
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TABLE A1: Evidence for drivers of framing dimensions 
Driver Exemplary quotes 
Stakeholder 
demands 
“We stress progress because we need to do science marketing. Whenever someone has a new result, we write a press release. Our 
PR department issues two, three press releases per month, and that is simply acquisition [i.e. fundraising]. We need to stay on the 
radar of industry, the public funding agencies, and the EU. We talk less about potential because we develop solar cells for the 
industry that you can manufacture at low costs and high conversion efficiencies.” (I6) 
“At Fraunhofer, we need to stay close to practice, to ensure our funding, particularly to achieve our share of industry funding […] 
That forces us to stay very realistic […] NREL is different, it’s a government lab. You can do more basic research there.” (I12) 
“And the DOE is funding something that is a little further out, that is breakthrough, that cannot easily be perceived as being an 
incremental effort that could just as well be done by industry. That is very important for their own reputation and standing with 
Congress.” (I3) 
“It is a strategic decision of NREL to address future potential and act accordingly. A Fraunhofer institute needs to be close to 
industry and work on issues related to progress.” (I1) 
Technology 
maturity 
“Potential, I mean, this is the reason why we wanted to do thin-film, because we thought it could be a hundred times cheaper. […] 
Performance; clearly, performance is the strength of [crystalline] silicon. The potential was considered to be low, but that didn’t 
turn out to be true.” (I15) 
“And if someone just came along and said‚ ‘Hey, thin-film is the best there is and you can forget about crystalline silicon!’ you’d 
soon lose credibility if the facts told a different story. […] The potential for thin-film exists, it simply hasn’t been realized yet.” (I9) 
“Certainly, the third-generation PV guys are going to be framing on potential almost exclusively, because they really don’t have 
progress like you would think about when you think of the efficiency for a manufacturable device.” (I13) 
“In terms of potential, one could still think of an argument why thin-film is superior.” (I15) 
 
TABLE A2: Evidence for drivers of framing tactics 
Driver Exemplary quotes 
Framing channels 
“You would frame things differently. The journalist, of course, needs to portray things in a completely simplified way because 
readers won’t buy very complicated things—whereas the scientist notices the details and is only interested in genuinely new 
things.” (I12) 
“Conference presentations and journal articles are identical [in terms of how things are being framed], there’s no big difference. 
When talking to newspapers you use broad brush-strokes and need to simplify. For them, you can’t try to compare five different 
technologies with each other. You need to argue in a more straightforward fashion. But you also shouldn’t be biased, or come to 
a wrong conclusion.” (I6) 
“[At a conference] one would say, there’s negative and positive aspects, what’s usually the case.” (I12) 
“You wouldn’t go down well at a conference [if you simplified things too much]. It would raise questions straight away: ‘That’s 
not realistic, what you say there. And there’s this and that that’s also important. And you can’t say it like that.’” (I12) 
Technology 
evolution 
“All these statements are based on technological development, which we really believe in. At least, that’s my personal 
conviction.” (I2)  
“I mean, the technology has evolved. Costs have come down, conversion efficiencies have gone up, and in the last couple of 
years industrial production has risen and is still rising at an astonishing rate. That’s correlated with the less favorable outlook for 
thin-film technologies.” (I6) 
“If you had asked me 10 years ago if we would really have a 50-per-cent-efficiency solar cell, I would have said that I wouldn’t 
think so. […] Today, after 10 years of research, I see that we can make the 50 per cent goal. […] You see how things can change. 
I really believe that scientists are driven by the solid ground they have under their feet.” (I1) 
“Crystalline silicon showed that it has the potential to become cheap, which had been in doubt before.” (I12) 
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